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BARRIERS TO AND ENABLERS FOR EUROPEAN RAIL FREIGHT 
TRANSPORT FOR INTEGRATED DOOR-TO-DOOR LOGISTICS SERVICE. 
PART 1: BARRIERS TO MULTIMODAL RAIL FREIGHT TRANSPORT 
 
Summary.  The objective of this paper is to examine and identify barriers  to  and 
enablers for the European rail freight transport services as a transport chain partner along 
the supply chains in the changing market scenario. The changing market scenario 
includes, among others, requiring 'door-to-door' rather than 'terminal to terminal' and 
integrated service, competitive ability to attract non-rail cargo type, changes in the 
customer requirements (e.g. reliable service) and changes in the operational requirements 
and practices. Using a literature review method, the paper is presented in two parts. The 
part 1 focuses on the identification of barriers to the European rail freight service by 
reviewing  freight logistics services for global supply chains followed by the current 
performance of European rail freight transport followed by a discussion on the rail freight 
market liberalisation in Europe. Then rail freight transport in the Unites States (U.S.) is 
discussed.  The research notes that although the background, scope and necessity for 
reform measures in Europe differ from those of the U.S., some lessons can be learned and 
the main lesson is that an appropriate reform measure can enhance rail sector competitive 
ability in Europe.  Examining and identifying the barriers in the part 1 (with the pan-
Pacific examples  of rail freight transports), the part 2 of the paper focuses on 
recommending clear actions and steps as enablers for the rail freight industry in general 
and operators in particular. The research in part 1 of the paper finds that: 
• In many European countries, the rail freight market is not fully liberalised. In such 
market segment, infrastructure managers do act independently for incumbents and new 
entrant operators that hamper the progress of building a competitive market; 
• The rail operators have not yet achieved the service quality (e.g. customer tailored 
service) needed for the modern supply chains; 
• They  operate  ‘terminal-to-terminal’  but modern supply chain needs door-to-door 
service; 
• They act primarily for the ‘terminal-to-terminal’ chain; but modern supply chain needs 
total transport chain; not a part of it. 
 
 
 
BARIERY I MOŻLIWOŚCI DLA EUROPEJSKIEGO PRZEWOZU TOWARÓW 
KOLEJĄ DO ZINTEGROWANEJ OBSŁUGI LOGISTYCZNEJ DOOR-TO-DOOR. 
CZĘŚĆ 1: BARIERY MULTIMODALNEGO TRANSPORTU TOWARÓW 
KOLEJĄ 
 
Streszczenie. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zbadanie i zidentyfikowanie barier oraz 
możliwości dla usług europejskiego przewozu towarów koleją jako partnera łańcucha 44   D.Md.Z. Islam 
 
transportowego wzdłuż łańcuchów dostaw w zmieniającej się sytuacji na rynku. Zmiana 
sytuacji na rynku obejmuje, między innymi potrzebę „door-to-door”, a nie „terminal-to-
terminal” oraz usługi zintegrowane, konkurencyjną zdolność przyciągania niekolejowych 
typów  ładunków,  zmiany  wymagań  klientów  (np.  niezawodny  serwis)  oraz  zmiany  
w wymaganiach operacyjnych i praktykach.  Przy zastosowaniu metody  przeglądu 
literatury artykuł składa się z dwóch części. Część 1. koncentruje się na identyfikacji 
barier  dla  usług  europejskiego  przewozu  towarów  koleją  przez  przegląd  towarowych 
usług  logistycznych  dla  globalnych  łańcuchów  dostaw,  a  następnie  przez  bieżącą 
wydajność europejskiego transportu towarów koleją, po czym przez dyskusję na temat 
liberalizacji rynku przewozu towarów w Europie. Omówiony został przewóz towarów 
koleją  w  Stanach  Zjednoczonych  (U.S.)  W  badaniu  zauważono,  że  choć  tło,  zakres  
i  konieczność  działań  reformatorskich  w  Europie  różnią  się  od  tych  z  USA.,  można 
wyciągnąć  pewne  wnioski,  a  główną  lekcją  jest  to,  że  właściwym  środkiem  reformy 
można  zwiększyć  zdolności  konkurencyjne  sektora  kolejowego w Europie. Część  2. 
artykułu skupia się na rekomendowaniu jasnych działań i kroków jako szans dla branży 
przewozu  towarów  koleją,  a  w  szczególności  dla  operatorów.  Badania  w  części  1. 
artykułu pokazują, że:  
• w wielu krajach europejskich rynek kolejowych przewozów towarowych nie jest w 
pełni  zliberalizowany.  W  takim  segmencie  rynku,  zarządcy  infrastruktury  działają 
niezależnie dla starych i nowo wchodzących operatorów, co utrudnia postęp budowy 
konkurencyjnego rynku; 
• operatorzy kolejowi nie osiągnęli jeszcze jakości usług (np. dostosowanie usług dla 
klienta) potrzebnej w nowoczesnych łańcuchach dostaw; 
• działają w sposób „terminal-to-terminal”, a nowoczesny łańcuch dostaw wymaga usług 
„door-to-door”; 
• działają przede wszystkim dla łańcucha „terminal-to-terminal”, a nowoczesny łańcuch 
dostaw wymaga całkowitego łańcucha transportowego, nie tylko jego części. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A freight transport service is a derived demand created through an agreement between a buyer, 
situated in one place, and a seller, situated in another. The agreement is either to sell, or to buy goods, 
under certain conditions (e.g. price, quantity, time), for the purpose of either trade or final 
consumption. It is a derived demand because it is created only when there is a necessity of movement 
(or another form of value addition) of the product from one place to another. The buyer may buy the 
product for further value addition (raw material for manufacturing or semi-finished products for 
assembling in a factory) or to sell in the market (e.g. retailers) or to sell to the final customer, for 
consumption. Although Great Britain, Western Europe and the United States (U.S.) were the birth 
places of modern manufacturing, plants – both manufacturing and assembly - have slowly moved from 
the West to the East, in search of low production costs. Countries such as India, China, and Indonesia 
have turned into global factories, producing for global customers, including the West. Even within the 
developing world, the movement of manufacturing plants continues, with countries such as 
Bangladesh able to lower the cost of manufacturing inputs (e.g. labour) still further. For example, in 
the garment-manufacturing sector, Bangladesh is now the second largest exporter in the world, behind 
China. 
Following manufacturing, or assembly, products are transported to the global market. The Western 
(developed) countries are hosting both assembly plants (for such products as cars) and high value-
adding factories (for such products as sophisticated weapons, commercial and  fighter planes). 
The effect in European countries has been a decline in export volume of such consumer goods and an 
increase in imports from Far East through major ports and in containers [1]. This change in production 
and consumption patterns can be further understood from the fact that in 2011 the major net (exports 
minus imports) exporting countries were: Russia (139 billion EUR), China (111), and Japan (58 in Barriers to and enablers for European rail freight transport for…  45 
 
2010), while the United States and the EU-27 were net importers, with 562 and 160 billion EUR 
respectively [2]. This demonstrates a clear change to freight transport customer types in Europe (and 
other developed countries), necessitating a different set of service offerings and a revised marketing 
approach from freight transport and logistics service operators and other relevant transport chain 
partners. There has been another change in the attitude towards the way goods are moved. 
Increasingly, buyers, sellers and other stakeholders -  such as government, or consumers -  are 
considering negative environmental impacts (e.g. pollution, noise) as an important issue, caused by 
transport services. Compared to other transport modes, such as road, rail transport is seen as 
environmentally friendly, as it emits lower greenhouse gases (e.g. CO2). However, rail  freight 
operators cannot be complacent about this environmental image. They must offer a competitive and 
reliable service, to shippers and consignees, to make the supply chain competitive. There can be three 
types of logistics service: freight logistics, container logistics and vessel logistics. Freight logistics can 
be defined as that part of the supply chain process that focuses on moving goods (e.g. in containers) 
along a transport chain. Container logistics optimizes the movements of the containers (or other) 
themselves - an operation that is directly linked to vessel or vehicle logistics, which is concerned with 
maximizing vessel/vehicle utilization [3]. As a comprehensive approach, the current paper addresses 
all three types of logistics, although major focus is on the competitive performance of rail freight 
logistics, as a partner, along the transport and supply chain. 
  
1.1. Objective  
 
The objective of this paper is to examine and identify barriers to and enablers for the European rail 
freight transport services as a transport chain partner along the supply chains in the changing market 
scenario. The changing market scenario includes, among others, requiring door-to-door or point-to-
point rather than terminal to terminal service, competitive ability to attract non-rail cargo type, 
changes in the customer requirements (e.g. reliable service) and changes in the operational 
requirements and practices.  
 
1.2. Methodology and structure  
 
Using a literature review method, the paper is presented in two parts. The part 1 focuses on 
identifying barriers to competitive rail freight transport service in Europe. For this the freight logistics 
services for global supply chains is discussed in section2. The European Union (EU) aims to establish 
a sustainable, competitive and reliable freight transport sector. Towards this, the EU Transport White 
Paper [4] sets a target of modal shift of 30% by 2030, and of 50% by 2050, from road freight transport 
for distances over 300km to rail (and waterways) transport. The freight logistics service is a partner of 
global supply chains. The rail freight industry in general and operators in particular need to understand 
this modern concept and practice accordingly. They need to follow recent trends linking their abilities, 
requirements  of the market and  setting  strategies of rail freight transport operations.  Then the 
performance of European rail freight transport is examined, in comparison to road freight transport (in 
section 3). This is followed, in section 4, by a discussion of rail freight market liberalization in Europe 
and, in section 5, rail freight transport in the U.S. Rail reform in the UK forms section 6. The research 
in the first and second segments identifies the factors and issues for making European rail freight 
transport operational competitive, effective, reliable, which in turn point towards the part 2 of the 
paper.  
Examining and identifying the barriers in the part 1 (with the pan-Pacific examples of rail freight 
transports), the part 2 of the paper focuses on recommending actions and steps as enablers for the rail 
freight industry in general and operators in particular. 
 
2. FREIGHT LOGISTICS SERVICES FOR THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
In a competitive market, many companies see an efficient and effective logistics service as a means 
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[5]. Freight logistics is generally about adding ‘place utility’ to a product; for example, the product 
needs to be moved, from one place in one country, to another place in another country [6, 7]. The 
product could be a raw material, to be processed in a factory (adding ‘form utility’), thus it will need 
supply or material management;, or a semi-finished product, requiring further value addition, in a 
factory in another country, to turn it into a finished product. Finished products are then sold in the 
market, in different countries, requiring physical distribution and global distribution management. The 
movement of products (the carriage terminology is goods or cargo or freight) is known as freight 
transportation  [8]. During transportation the product may need to be stored (i.e. the warehousing 
element of logistics), either adjacent to the factory or in a suitable place along the transit route, 
possibly in another country. This period of storage adds a further dimension of logistics: ‘time utility’. 
Factories obtain supplies from all over the world and, after adding ‘form utility’, sell their products in 
the global market place. A supply chain may need different types of storage: raw material ‘waiting for 
inbound supply’ to factory; ‘waiting for production in factory’; and the finished product ‘waiting for 
physical distribution’ (to be sold, or to the customer). In this process, Langley et al. [7] notes that 
companies seek to rationalise their global networks and introduce the important ‘global’ or 
‘worldwide’ aspect into the arena of freight transport, logistics and supply chain. Inherently, this 
imposes challenges, including a higher level of volatility of supply and demand, due to the varying 
ability and quality of different partners along the transport and supply chain. For example, there is 
huge variety in the transport infrastructure condition, quality and capability of China, Russia and the 
European countries [9] yet, in a supply chain involving partners from all these countries, each must 
play a significant role in making it competitive, effective and reliable. A good transport infrastructure 
in just Europe, or China, is not enough to achieve this.  
On occasion, supply chain unreliability and volatility can come from sources beyond the control of 
the supply chain and transport chain partners, for example from natural disasters. The unprecedented 
2011  Tōhoku  (Japan)  earthquake  and  subsequent  tsunami,  on  11  March  2011,  killed  and  injured 
thousands of people, destroyed thousands of houses, offices and factories and dismantled transport 
infrastructure, as well as many supply chains, e.g. Nissan’s UK car manufacturing transplant that 
receives inputs from, among others, Japanese manufacturing plants. However, to minimise the more 
usual and frequent volatility in the modern supply chain, the freight transport and logistics service 
providers, as supply chain partners, have an important role to play in providing a time- and cost-
effective, reliable service. Achieving such a competitive and effective supply chain requires a 
competitive market environment and marketing strategy, including supply chain partners with the 
resilience capacity to respond to such occasional, or regular, volatilities. Many actors must play their 
part to achieve such a service, including transport chain actors, third party logistics service providers, 
port/terminal operators, port authorities and customs and border control agencies [8].  
A transport chain may consist of so-called transport legs: deep sea (e.g. Singapore port to 
Rotterdam port in the Netherlands); short sea (e.g. Chittagong port in Bangladesh to Singapore port; 
and inland transport (by road, rail or waterways) at both ends of the transport chain. Depending on the 
final destination, the inland leg may need a combination of road and rail, or road and waterways, 
transport. There can be a variation in the demand and supply of freight transport and logistics services, 
due to scope, understanding, practice and the needs of customers, where concepts and practices such 
as just in time (‘JIT’), or ‘Push’ and ‘Pull’, play an important role. To determine an optimal inventory 
level, concepts such as JIT or ‘Pull’ technique are often applied, implying that the buyer will receive 
the product only when it is needed. This concept aims to have an effective inventory level of “zero” or 
“near zero” to eliminate/reduce the inventory cost (including capital and interest). The frequent and 
smaller shipment size associated with “zero” or “near zero” inventory, means a higher transport cost. 
It will also require a higher level of reliability in its transport service. The frequent transport service 
needs may lead to more environmental damage, by emitting higher CO2, for example.  
A typical shipper (or consignee) is interested in buying a transport service from a single operator 
(say an international shipping line, or a multimodal operator) who will take responsibility for the 
completion of all legs, not just deep sea, or inland. For this, the shipping line may subcontract the 
inland transport to a rail freight operator, known as ‘carrier haulage’. Alternatively, the shipper may 
take the responsibility for the inland transportation, which is known as ‘merchant haulage’ [45]. Barriers to and enablers for European rail freight transport for…  47 
 
Notteboom and Winkelmans [10] suggest that maritime shipping lines try to enhance the share of 
carrier haulage in Europe by, for example, establishing partnerships and alliances with shuttle train 
operations. To achieve a higher level of integrated transport service, by moving from ‘push’ logistics 
to ‘pull’ logistics, Monios [11] suggests an extended gate terminal haulage concept, where some of the 
traditional terminal activities, performed in a maritime port, are moved to an inland terminal, or 
port/depot. Depending on factors such as cargo type (e.g. high or low value, time sensitive), frequency 
and shipment size, distance, transit time etc., the inland, as well as total, freight transport service 
options can be determined, by either shippers, consignees, shipping lines or multimodal operator, 
depending who is in control of the transport chain. Notteboom and Winkelmans [10] suggest that the 
international shipping lines face obstacles in expanding the network of rail intermodal services, due to, 
among others, the fact that the European railway sector is partly liberalised. This liberalisation is 
addressed in the next part of this paper.  
Rodrigue and Notteboom [12] suggest that the ‘push’ logistics system involves a limited level of 
integration between suppliers, manufacturers and distributors. In contrast, a ‘pull’ logistics system 
aims to achieve a higher level of efficiency, through integration and synchronization. For such 
services, the question is whether rail can be a partner in the pull logistics chain, or whether it will 
continue its activity in the push logistics chain, in a more segmental way. Due to its dynamism, 
responsiveness and proactive roles, logistics customers may prefer road, for short to medium distance; 
road-maritime intermodal transport, for longer distance; and even road-air intermodal transport 
solutions, for higher value goods. Thus, it might be said that rail is a less favourable transport mode, in 
such situations. By contrast, the ‘push’ system is a traditional concept that implies a manufacturer will 
produce products in large quantities and make them ready for sale in the market. This practice requires 
the manufacturer to maintain a certain level of inventory; this may be stored in different warehouses, 
in a variety of locations, and will require in-factory movement of the materials - mostly performed by 
localised road transport. Assumptions and forecasts about future sale potential are also required. In this 
traditional approach, the buyer also will purchase product in larger lot sizes; will maintain a level of 
inventory, necessitating warehousing facilities, involving capital and interest cost plus warehousing 
costs such as rent, lighting, heating, security etc. In this case, a slower and possibly less reliable 
transport service may be acceptable, making transport cheaper. In such situations, rail and waterways 
transport services become favourable modes of transport. Product characteristics and market 
opportunities may influence the desired level of inventory and the type of transport involved. For 
example, seasonal products, such as multiple-design Christmas cards, will elicit different behaviour 
than standard products that are sold all year round. As well as transport service type, transport haul is 
an important factor influencing inventory levels. 
Cargo centres in Europe are densely situated, requiring lower average transport haul compared to 
other continents, for example North America. But rail is inherently more competitive over long 
distance transport as well as on high-density traffic corridors, for example in North America [13]. 
Currently, European rail freight transport does well for low value high volume cargo (e.g. coal) for 
longer transport haul for big customers (such as power plant). It can be noted road freight transport is 
generally competitive and suitable for short distance for both small and medium size (SME) and non-
SME customers; but there are many road freight transport services in Europe that are competitive over 
distances of more than 400km. For example, Jackson et al. [14] notes that, for distances over 500km in 
the EU-27 and CH, in 2009, about 19% of low-density, high value (LDHV) cargo was transported by 
road transport. In contrast, rail freight transport is competitive for longer distances; although Jackson 
et al [14] argue that, for LDHV cargo, a modal shift from road to rail freight transport is possible. 
They claim that over a distance of 200km, between terminals and with pre- and post-haulage added, 
rail can be competitive as a door-to-door rail intermodal service. Gouvernal and Daydou [15] links the 
rail freight sector’s success in attracting more (non-traditional rail) cargo - whether LDHV or other for 
SMEs or non-SMEs customers - with the degree of market liberalisation that exists. Considering this, 
the next section will focus on rail freight performance in Europe, the UK and the U. S. and also on rail 
liberalisation.  
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3. RAIL FREIGHT TRANSPORT IN EUROPE 
 
In 2011, with a population of 501 million, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the EU-27 
amounted to $17, 552 billion, a 25.1% share of world GDP. In comparison, with a population of 310 
million, the GDP of the United States was 21.6% ($15, 094 billion) of world GDP ($69, 971.5 billion) 
(16).  
Within the EU27, in 2011, an estimated total of 3824 billion tonne-kilometres (btkm) of goods 
were transported. This is a slightly lower figure than in 2010, and includes intra-EU air and sea 
transport, but excludes transport between the EU and the rest of the world. Of this, road transport 
accounted for 45.3%; intra-EU maritime transport for 36.8%; rail for 11%; inland waterways for 3.7%; 
oil pipelines for 3.1%; and intra-EU air transport for only 0.1%. Between 1995 and 2011 (see 
Figure 1), total freight volume increased, from 3060 btkm to 3824 btkm, a total growth of 25.0%. 
From a modal point of view, over the same period, road freight transport volume increased, from 1289 
btkm to 1734 btkm - a total growth of 34.6%. In contrast, rail freight transport has increased by 8.8%, 
from 386 btkm to 420 btkm, over the same period [16]. The lower growth in rail freight volume is due 
partly, on the one hand, to the structural change in manufacturing industry and consumption pattern, 
previously discussed and, on the other hand, the lack of response to the new freight transport 
requirement [1].  
Another important aspect of European rail freight transport is single wagon-load (SWL) traffic that 
provides input to the full trainload freight service between hubs; but its share declined from 41% of 
total rail freight volume in 2002 to 31% in 2008 due to intense competition from road [17]. The inland 
transport containers are also dominated by road freight transport (see figure 2) [18, 19]. Road 
congestion is becoming an increasingly serious problem, where rail freight can be seen as an important 
alternative solution [15].  
With this freight transport performance, the European Union [4,  19]  desires to achieve a low 
carbon economy by 2030/2050 through optimising the performance of multimodal transport, achieving 
a modal shift of 30% by 2030 and 50% by 2050, from road freight transport (over 300 km) to rail and 
waterways transport. Multimodal transport, compared to uni-modal road and air, consumes less energy 
and emits less CO2 and is thus more environmentally friendly [20]. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Trend of freight transport volume in EU27 [16] 
Rys. 1. Tendencja wielkości przewozów towarowych w UE-27 [16] Barriers to and enablers for European rail freight transport for…  49 
 
 
Fig. 2. Typical inland distribution of containers from maritime ports [18] 
Rys. 2. Typowa dystrybucja śródlądowa kontenerów z portów morskich [18] 
 
4. RAIL FREIGHT MARKET LIBERALIZATION IN EUROPE 
 
Monios [11] illustrates the impact of rail liberalisation by citing one traffic route between Valencia 
and Coslada in Spain. In the liberalised environment, the share of rail traffic has increased from 10% 
in 2007, to 40% in 2010, carried by some new entrant private operators and incumbent RENFE. To 
enhance competitive ability and to increase market share of rail freight transport to a reasonable level, 
or at least at the pace of GDP growth, through improved competitiveness and efficiency, the railway 
transport ownership and operation have been reformed in Europe, from a command economy to a 
market-based, open, competitive one. Since 1991, this has been achieved through a series of Directives 
and through three Railway Reform Packages, suggesting that the Railway Directive 91/440/EEC of 
1991 was an important turning point for rail liberalisation in Europe [15, 21]. Subsequently, the reform 
packages were issued to transform the state owned and operated European national railways (both 
freight and passenger) into commercial companies, to allow them to compete with each other (i.e. 
intra-rail competition) in a free market. Another objective of these reform measures is that the 
European rail freight market becomes free for new entrant private operators. Ultimately, both 
incumbent and new rail entrant operators will be able to compete with each other, as well as with other 
modes, e.g. road. One important objective of the European rail liberalisation was, and still is, the 
separation of infrastructure managers (IM) from operational services (railway undertaking - RU) so 
that the IM play a fair and independent role, in terms of easy and non-discriminatory access to path 
allocation and for charging, for both incumbent and new entrants, to prevent anti-competition 
practices. 
Since 1 January 2007, the European rail freight market has been ostensibly a free market, where 
both incumbent and new entrant operators are able to compete on every line and in every EU member 
state [22]. However, as expected, reforms were not universally applied in all countries. Some (e.g. 
UK) went for full implementation (and beyond) e.g. complete separation of infrastructure and 
operation, while others remain at the opposite end of the spectrum [23]. The reformed UK rail freight 
market has become a success story, showing 2.5% annual growth (in tonne-km), even registering 
growth during recession, in both tonnes and tonne-km [1]. The study links the success of UK rail with 
privatisation in 1996 [1]. In contrast, the Railway Gazette International [24] reports that the European 50   D.Md.Z. Islam 
 
Court of Justice found that Hungary and Spain failed to comply with the obligation of separating IM 
from train operators, as per the First Railway Reform Package. The Court also found that the state 
railway holding company models in Austria and Germany complied with the legislation; however 
Lloydsloadinglist.com [25] reports that Europe’s two biggest state railways - Deutsche Bahn (DB) and 
SNCF - have locked horns, accusing each other of unfair competition in the rail freight market. It can 
be noted here that the IMs in both countries are sister organisations of the government owned and 
operated RUs. Lloydsloadinglist.com [26]  also reported that DB Schenker’s French rail freight 
subsidiary, Euro Cargo Rail (ECR), has made claims that rival operator Fret SNCF, subsidiary of 
French state railways SNCF, is engaged in anti-competition practices. ECR claimed that the rival is 
still offering below-cost rates, despite hefty fines by the rail regulator in 2012. Following a complaint 
lodged by ECR in 2009, Fret SNCF was criticised, in December 2012, for a number of commercial 
practices that were designed to hinder and delay the arrival of new market entrants into the French rail 
freight market, which runs contrary to the railway reform measures. 
The above examples of complaints and criticisms demonstrate that, in reality, some national IMs 
(and/or regulators) in Europe are not separated from the operations. Thus, directly or indirectly, some 
operators gain advantage from their government owned and operated sister organisation, funded by the 
taxpayer, which detracts from the creation of a truly competitive rail freight market. This may 
contribute to slower growth of rail freight volume, despite the aforementioned reform initiatives, 
directives, reform packages and warnings from the European commission. The European Commission 
[27] issued its Fourth Railway Package on the 30 January 2013, focussing on, among other things, the 
clear separation of infrastructure from operation; facilitating the easy entrance of new operators; and 
rail authorisation and safety certification through one single authority – the European Railway Agency 
(ERA)  -  to improve the competitiveness and quality of service whilst reducing bureaucracy. 
Recognising its pros and cons, the Community of European Railway and infrastructure companies 
(CER) opined that the package will deeply affect the functioning of the railways and favour the 
creation of an EU Network of National Regulatory Bodies, for example, National Safety Authorities 
instead of ERA  [28]. The International Union for Road-Rail Combined Transport (UIRR) [29] 
expressed its appreciation for ‘mandatory structural separation for integrated state-owned railway 
companies’. Considering the fact that DB and SNCF are important players in rail  freight (and 
passenger) transport in Europe, Nash [30] suggested that ‘Possible alternatives to full separation might 
include enhanced measure to prevent discrimination within holding groups, strengthening rules on 
independent decision making, or placing essential functions such as capacity allocation and the setting 
of infrastructure charges into a separate body.’  However,  Railway Gazette [31]  reports that the 
European Parliament has adopted by a large majority amendments that has scaled back the proposals 
on the independence of infrastructure management and financial transparency within vertically-
integrated holding group structures. With this development, the author think that there will be a little 
change or improvement compared to the pre-Fourth Railway Package market environment.  
The concept of contestability was first introduced by Baumol [32] by that states that ‘it is possible 
to get the benefits of competition without the requirement of a large number of competing firms’. This 
is probably true in the case of intra-rail competition, as there is always some sort of oligopoly in such 
services as rail freight transport, since only a few rail operators can be allowed to operate on a 
particular route or corridor. But these operators have to compete with other modes, in particular road. 
Thus, rail freight operators have to be able to compete with other modes by offering, among other 
differentiators, competitive services with higher reliability and lower prices. In the case of other (than 
rail) modes, the IMs (e.g. Highway Agency for road transport in the UK) are separated from the 
operations (e.g. road haulage) to ensure a competitive and contestable market for all. Brewer [33] 
suggested the requirements for a contestable market include: costless market entry and exit; entry that 
involves very small or no sunk costs; all firms (incumbent and new entrant) being subject to the same 
regulations; and market pricing practices that prevent the use of responsive pricing by the incumbent 
operators. Most of these competitive market conditions were contained in the focus of the Fourth 
Railway Reform Package, noted before; but unfortunately did not get approval by the European 
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There are further complexities in the European rail freight sector: for example, the sharing of 
railway lines with passenger trains; higher priority for passenger trains than for freight trains [13]; 
lower freight train speed; net weight of freight wagons; and ageing wagon fleets. The complexity of 
rail transport in Europe can be understood from the following statement: 
‘The West Coast Main Line (in the UK) is the busiest mixed traffic railway in Europe. There are 12 
different operators. Fast and slow passenger trains mix with each other and heavy freight trains. 
Different trains stop at different stations, with different frequency, and other lines join it at regular 
intervals. And like Transport for London we need to find time to deliver maintenance and upgrade 
work.’ [34]  
Few of these complexities exist in the United States’ (U.S.) rail freight sector, making comparison 
irrelevant. However, in order to learn lessons from the U.S. rail reform measures, the performance of 
its rail freight sector is discussed in the next section. 
 
 
5. RAIL FREIGHT TRANSPORT IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The rail freight transport sector in the U. S. has been performing much better than its European 
counterpart and ownership and operational differences should be noted. Virtually all U.S. railway 
networks and infrastructure (except the Northeast Corridor, owned by Amtrak) are owned by freight 
lines (operators) for their business operational purposes, while passenger operators (mainly Amtrak) 
operate as tenants on the freight lines. Unlike Europe, this prevents passenger trains being given 
higher priority over freight trains. One rail freight operator competes with another, as there are two or 
more railways, operating in parallel routes, in addition to the competition from trucking sector [13]). 
However, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), under the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
regulates operations. In Europe, by contrast, individual IMs (e.g. Network Rail in the UK) and/or 
respective rail regulators (e.g. ORR- Office of Rail Regulator, in the UK) regulate operations, although 
efforts are in place (as proposed in the Fourth Railway Package) to establish ERA as the single 
regulator. The FRA oversees operations to ensure a competitive environment, although there are 
complaints of monopolist charging rates by freight operators to customers (shippers/consignees), in 
certain geographic locations, who may have access to only one rail freight operator. Also, the U.S. rail 
transport haul is much longer than in Europe. (Section 2 already discussed the need for a longer 
transport haul in effective operation of rail freight services.) 
The total volume of goods transported has increased from 4162 btkm in 1990, to 5866 btkm in 
2007 (a growth of c41%). Of this, road transport has increased from 1239 btkm in 1990 to 1922 btkm 
in 2007 (55% growth). During the same period U.S. railways achieved a total of 70% growth, from 
1554 btkm in 1990, to 2656 btkm in 2007 [35].  
Many people link reform measures with the U. S. railways’ success story. For example, Spychalski 
and Swan [36] suggest that three reform measures: the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform 
Act of 1976 (4R Act); the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 (SRA); and the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA) have downsized as well modernised the U. S. rail freight 
industry. This has resulted in reduced freight rates and dramatic improvements in productivity. Figure 
3 displays the effects of reform measures (in particular the Staggers Action of 1980) on US railway 
industry. Spychalski and Swan [36] concluded that the success was achieved through the termination 
of loss-making services, use of more modern and eﬃcient  equipment,  ﬂexible  work  rules,  and 
reductions in employment, rather than through structural change in the industry, unlike that in Europe. 
Levinson [37] reports that ‘Trucks and railcars that had often been forced to return empty were able to 
get cargo for backhauls. -- --. For the first time, railroads and their customers could negotiate long-
term contracts setting rates and terms of service. ---. Freight transportation within the United States 
was reshaped dramatically. Costs fell so steeply that by 1988, U. S. Shippers – and, ultimately, U. S. 
consumers – saved nearly one-six of their total land freight bill’. The Economist [38] reported that 
‘before deregulation America's railways were going bust. The return on capital fell from a meagre 
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huge shock, including a financial crisis. By 1980 a fifth of rail mileage was owned by bankrupt firms. 
Rail's share of intercity freight had slumped to 35% from 75% in the 1920s.’ 
 
 
Fig. 3. U. S. rail freight before and after the Staggers Act 1980 (1981=100) [39] 
Rys. 3. Przewóz towarów koleją Stanów Zjednoczonych przed Ustawą i po Ustawie Straggers 1980 (1981=100) 
            [39] 
 
6. UK RAIL REFORM – A GOOD EXMAPLE? 
 
From the perspective of European railway reform, the UK can be seen as a good example. In all 
three Rail Liberalisation Indices: 2004, 2007 and 2011, UK railways stood at the top of the ranking 
conducted by IBM Global Business Services [23]. Since privatisation in 1996, rail freight has 
undergone a transformation programme, resulting in transportation of an increased share of consumer 
goods. Customers such as Jaguar Cars, Tesco, and Sainsbury, with high value goods, are increasingly 
being added to the rail freight customer base and consumer goods transport by rail has increased by 
75% over the last eight years - the greatest growth of any freight market [39]. Since July 2007 a 
Strategic Freight Network (SFN) has been in place, that takes opinion from a stakeholder group that 
includes ports, shipping lines, manufacturing, logistics service providers, retailers, quarrying and 
construction and, of course, rail freight service users, to ensure a highly functioning UK rail freight 
industry. The SFN consists of a series of linked schemes, with a rolling programme of investments in 
more productive infrastructure -  e.g.  loading gauge enhancement to allow taller 9’6” container 
movement; locomotives, wagons and terminals -  aimed at improving the performance, economic 
efficiency and capacity of freight on rail [39-42]. Since privatisation, the productivity of the UK rail 
freight operation has improved substantially. For example, freight operating company staff numbers 
per freight train kilometre have fallen significantly (from 1998-99=100 to about 66 in 2008-09) [43]. 
The improvement in the productivity of UK rail freight operation can be observed from the fact that, 
despite the decline in train kilometres between 2005 and 2011, the tonne kilometres remained almost 
unchanged, implying longer and heavier trains. Also the average transport haul length per train has 
increased in recent years [1]. Reliability and/or punctuality are at the top of the priority list for many 
types of customers, in particular for consumer goods. The punctuality of freight train operations 
improved continuously until 2009-2010, since when there has been a decline (see Figure 4), for 
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delay were attributable to train operators, terminal operators, network, or shippers. The author strongly 
believes independent research is needed to unearth the true information on, among others, 
productivity, punctuality and causes of delays. 
The freight performance measure (FPM) provides an indication of punctuality for freight journeys 
where 'on time' means arrival at final destination within 10 minutes of schedule. The FPM allows 
freight operators to measure performance in similar manner to the public (passenger) performance 
measure (PPM), which provides an indicator of passenger train performance and which has been in 
place for a long time. This is particularly important when freight demands equal priority in terms of 
path allocation, infrastructure charge and other operational aspects. Overall, before privatisation total 
freight volume was in decline whereas and since privatisation the annual volume of freight moved by 
rail has increased; albeit at a slower rate (see Figure 5). The fluctuation in total rail freight volume 
(tkm) is primarily due to the fluctuation in coal transport, attributable to two main reasons: the 
changeable demand for coal for power stations and the choice of port of entry relative to the 
consuming power station. It can be noticed that, in recent years, the total volume of net freight moved 
by rail has increased, despite a decline in coal transport, as rail freight operators have substituted other 
cargoes by adopting marketing strategy and also due to improvements in the railway network (e.g. 
higher gauge clearance to accommodate high cubes/containers) and. Very recently, coal volumes have 
begun to recover, due to high gas prices. The Port of Felixstowe [44] reveals that scheduled freight 
trains (of Freightliner, GB Rail freight and DB Schenker) are arriving at their terminals from inland 
origins (such as Birmingham, Manchester, Scunthorpe, Bristol, Doncaster, Ditton, and Daventry) 
almost 24 hours a day, six days a week (not Sundays), averaging 30 services per day. There is more 
demand for rail freight services than these routes can accommodate. Another example of good rail 
freight operational practice is that the port of Southampton is operating in and out rail freight services 
regularly. It can be noted that average transport haul in the UK is short. With this limitation,  the UK 
rail freight operators have been able to respond to the structural change (from raw material and semi-
finished to semi-finished and consumer goods) by working closely with ports, an important partner 
along supply chains, with effective marketing strategy as well as the government’s efforts and 
supports (e.g. in the form of grants) to enhance infrastructure e.g. gauge clearance (to allow transport 
of high cubes), which has led to significant increase in the share of containerised cargo in the total rail 
freight volume [1]. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Punctuality of UK freight trains (data from Network Rail, UK) 
Rys. 4. Punktualność pociągów towarowych w Wielkiej Brytanii (dane z Sieci Kolejowej UK) 
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Fig. 5. Net Annual Freight moved by rail before and after privatisation (in 1996) (btkm) 
Rys. 5. Roczny przewóz netto przewozu towarów koleją przed prywatyzacją i po prywatyzacji (w 1996 r.) 
            (btkm) 
 
 
7. KEY BARRIERS TO THE COMPETITIVENESS OF EUROPEAN RAILFREIGHT   
 
The study finds that the key barriers to the competitive rail freight service in Europe are:  
•  The European rail freight transport market is not yet fully liberalised to allow free and fair 
competition among the incumbents and new entrants. This situation restricts the competitive 
ability of the rail freight operators.  
•  Currently the rail freight operators offer segmental ‘terminal-to-terminal’ services whereas the 
supply chain for European customers requires ‘integrated’ ‘door-to-door’ services, as a supply 
chain partner.  
•  Currently they offer service to mainly big customers with low value high volume cargoes and 
generally  do not include  SMEs  with comparatively higher value cargoes that represent a 
significant market share. 
 
The readers are requested to read the part 2 of this paper that will recommend actions and steps, as 
enablers, to remove the barriers noted above to achieve a competitive rail freight transport system in 
Europe. 
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